An Arbitrator’s Authority to Award Attorney Fees for Bad-Faith Arbitration - Chapter 39 - AAA Handbook on Arbitration Practice - Second Edition
John W. Hinchey is a former partner at King & Spalding LLP, and is now a fulltime
arbitrator and mediator with JAMS, who focuses his practice on domestic and
international construction dispute resolution. He is a Past President of the American
College of Construction Lawyers, former Chair of the ABA Forum on the Construction
Industry He is co-author of a treatise, the International Construction Arbitration
Handbook, published by ThomsonWest (2015 ed). He is a CIArb Chartered Arbitrator
and currently arbitrates disputes for the American Arbitration Association, JAMS, the
ICC, CPR, and the London Court of International Arbitration.
Thomas V. Burch joined the Georgia Law faculty in 2011 after starting his academic career as an assistant visiting professor at the Florida State University College of Law in 2009. He works closely with the law school's moot court program and Appellate Litigation Clinic. Before entering the legal academy in 2009, Burch was a litigation associate at King & Spalding in Atlanta, Ga.; Balch & Bingham in Birmingham, Ala.; and Hopping Green & Sams in Tallahassee, Fla.
Originally from:
AAA Handbook on Arbitration Practice - Second Edition
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CHAPTER 39
AN ARBITRATOR’S AUTHORITY TO AWARD
ATTORNEY FEES FOR BAD-FAITH ARBITRATION
John W. Hinchey and Thomas V. Burch
I. Introduction
During the classical period of Roman law, attorneys did not charge fees
for legal advice or services.1 Consequently, high legal fees were no deterrent
to filing a lawsuit. To ensure that parties did not abuse these free services
and initiate litigation in bad faith, Roman jurists adopted the principle of lis
crescens in duplum, which allowed them to double the judgment against
anyone who initiated litigation without good cause.2 So began the longstanding
tradition of penalizing parties for bad-faith litigation.3
Approximately 2000 years later, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
bad faith as an exception to the “American Rule” on shifting attorney
fees.4 While the Court did not explain whether this exception applied in
arbitration, it has since pushed a “national policy favoring arbitration,”5
which has caused arbitration to become significantly more prevalent in
the American adjudicatory process. As a result, courts have struggled to
determine the extent, if any, that the principle of penalizing parties for
bad faith applies in modern arbitration.
The answer depends on several factors. First, does the parties’
contract grant the arbitrator authority to award attorney fees? If so, then
the answer is clear. The arbitrator can make an award of attorney fees for
bad-faith arbitration. If not, then one must look to the law that governs
the arbitration agreement. That is the subject of this chapter.
We discuss an arbitrator’s authority to award attorney fees for badfaith
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA), the 2000 Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
(RUAA), and the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial
Arbitration Rules. We also examine the definition of bad faith, briefly
address preemption under the FAA, and provide a short justification for
allowing arbitrators to make bad-faith awards.